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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3865 
___________ 
 
I-KIEM SMITH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. J. PRICE; SGT. M. SHEETZ; CO S. CRAMER; C.O. 1 R. HARPER; C.O. 1 
J. KENNEDY; C.O. 1 A. HARPSTER; B. HARRINGTON, 
a/k/a B. Herrington; DR. DREIBELBIS, Correctional Healthcare Administration; 
JOHN DOE, Physician Assistant; C. MITCHELL, Hearing Examiner; 
SUPERINTENDENT J. D. FISHER; LIEUTENANT J. LEAR; 
CO R. WERTZ; CLAOR; A. VOGT; ASHLEY; HOZLETT; CLAPPER; 
LT. J. ELCHENLOUB; CAPT. GROVE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-01581) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 21, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 I-Kiem Smith, a Pennsylvania inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 
appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on 
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in part 
and vacate in part the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 On February 17, 2011, correctional staff at the State Correctional Institute in 
Smithfield, Pennsylvania, used force against Smith twice.  The first incident occurred 
after Smith’s exercise period when, for reasons the parties dispute, several guards 
grabbed Smith and pressed him against an exercise pen.  The second incident occurred 
shortly thereafter when the guards were escorting Smith back to his cell.  For reasons that 
are again disputed, several guards forced Smith to the ground and struggled to shackle 
and restrain him.  Prison video cameras recorded both incidents from multiple angles, but 
the recordings are silent and do not show everything.  After the incidents, two of the 
defendants filed misconduct reports against Smith for resisting them.  Smith was found 
guilty of one of the misconducts; the other was dismissed as duplicative. 
 Smith then commenced the foregoing § 1983 action, alleging excessive force, 
retaliation, deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and due process violations 
against numerous defendants.  On the defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed 
many claims and defendants, leaving only Smith’s excessive force and retaliation claims 
3 
 
against the defendants that used force on him and his retaliatory discipline claims against 
defendants Harper and Lear. 
 After discovery, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment.  The 
Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment, primarily based on the 
video evidence.  The District Judge agreed and granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.  Smith timely appealed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over a District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  Giles v. Kearney, 
571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the record 
establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In making this 
determination, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
255 (1986).  However, in a case such as this one, where there are video recordings of the 
incidents in question, we need not adopt the non-movant’s version of the facts if the 
recordings “blatantly contradict[]” the non-movant’s version “so that no reasonable jury 
could believe it.”  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
 In his appellate brief, Smith limits his arguments to his excessive force claims.  To 
recover on a claim of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show 
that his treatment amounted to an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”  Whitley 
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v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).  Whether the use of force rises to such a level is 
determined by ‘“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’”  Hudson 
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).  In resolving 
this question, a court must evaluate “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the 
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of 
injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as 
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them; 
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”  Giles, 571 F.3d 
at 326.  “Force that exceeds that which is reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances is actionable.”  Id. at 328. 
 Smith contends that the defendants’ uses of force were sadistic and malicious 
because they were unprovoked and unjustified.  Although video evidence portrays the 
incidents, he argues that it does not blatantly contradict his account, and that the District 
Court erred by construing the evidence in favor of the defendants.  In other words, Smith 
argues that the District Court took the exception in Scott too far.  After careful review of 
the video evidence, we disagree with Smith as to the first incident, but agree as to the 
second.   
 The two videos of the first incident begin with Smith exercising alone in his 
exercise pen.  They then show defendant Price approach Smith’s pen, and the two appear 
to engage in a discussion, the content of which is disputed and not resolved by the silent 
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videos.  Several other guards arrive and, after additional discussion, one of the guards 
handcuffs Smith through the pen door.  As the same guard prepares to open the door, 
Smith’s side faces the door.  Another guard then speaks to Smith and points to the back 
of the pen, after which Smith moves so that his back faces the pen door.  A guard then 
opens the door and, while exiting, Smith turns to face the guards and steps toward them.  
Several guards then push Smith into the opposite pen gate, where they hold him still for 
several seconds before releasing pressure and leading him down the corridor to his 
housing unit. 
 The defendants contend they used force on Smith because, by turning to face and 
step towards them, he violated prison rules and orders to exit the pen backwards.  Smith 
contends no such rule exists and that he received no such orders, but the evidence as a 
whole clearly contradicts his contentions.  First, the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) 
handbook states that inmates are to face away from the cell door before exiting and that 
they will be backed out of the cell.  Smith contends that this applies to cells, not exercise 
pens, but additional video evidence Smith submitted of other inmates exiting an exercise 
pen blatantly contradicts this assertion.  In it, before exiting the exercise pen, two inmates 
stand with their backs to the pen door.  Once the pen door is opened, the inmates are 
slowly backed out of the pen one at a time.  Further, in the video of Smith’s own exit, 
immediately before the door was opened, a guard makes a statement to Smith and points 
to the back of the pen, after which Smith stands with his back to the pen door.  This video 
evidence confirms the defendants’ assertions that inmates are to exit the exercise pen 
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backwards and blatantly contradicts Smith’s assertions otherwise.  It also shows that the 
defendants used limited force to restore discipline, not cause harm, and thus the District 
Court correctly concluded that the force used was not excessive under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6.   
 As to the second incident, however, the evidence is not so clear.  The defendants 
contend they forced Smith to the ground because he removed or attempted to remove his 
left handcuff.  Smith disputes these assertions and contends that the defendants forced 
him to the ground without a valid justification and to cause harm.  The video evidence 
does not resolve this key question.  It does not show Smith remove or attempt to remove 
his left handcuff; indeed, it does not show Smith’s left hand or arm free at any point.  All 
the video shows on this point is that Smith’s left arm moves slightly upward immediately 
before the guards forced him to the ground, but it is not clear whether the guard holding 
Smith’s left arm or Smith caused this motion. 
 After Smith is forced to the ground, the incident becomes even less clear.  Smith’s 
body is covered with guards, and rapid movements make it difficult to discern exactly 
what occurred.  Further, at several points the view is blocked by guards standing or 
walking around Smith.  Smith contends the guards exacted gratuitous violence during this 
struggle, including hitting his face into the floor, punching him, rubbing his face in blood, 
jumping on him, putting extreme pressure on his neck, and generally beating his body.  
The defendants deny these assertions and contend that the video evidence blatantly 
contradicts them.   
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 Reviewed carefully, the videos show one guard forcefully press Smith’s face on 
the ground at least twice. The videos also show upper body movement by other guards, 
though that movement is largely obscured. At one point, a guard places a jacket on the 
ground near Smith’s face. After Smith is escorted out, this jacket remains and appears 
blood stained. Smith’s neck is not visible in the videos of the encounter, as moving 
guards cover his upper body throughout the video’s duration.  Given how little can be 
ascertained from the video, it cannot be said that the record “blatantly contradict[s]” 
Smith’s allegations that the guards placed repeated, excessive pressure on his neck and 
rubbed his face in blood.  Thus, the exception in Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, to the normal 
requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
does not apply.  Accepting Smith’s version of the facts, the defendants forced him to the 
ground while handcuffed and gratuitously assaulted him without provocation or cause.  
Accordingly, as to the second incident, he has raised a genuine dispute of material fact 
that precludes summary judgment on his excessive force claim.  See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 
5-6; Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).  
III. 
 Smith has not raised any arguments as to his retaliation claims.  Accordingly, we 
deem that issue waived and will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
on his retaliation claims.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that issues not raised on appeal are generally deemed abandoned and waived).  
That said, although Smith did not discuss qualified immunity, our holding as to his 
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excessive force claim necessarily undermines the District Court’s qualified immunity 
ruling.  The Supreme Court has “mandated a two-step sequence for resolving . . . 
qualified immunity claims.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  First, courts 
must determine whether the defendant’s alleged or proven conduct violated the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.  Id.  If so, then courts must determine whether this conduct violated 
rights that were clearly established at the time of the incident.  Id.  The District Court 
found the defendants did not violate Smith’s constitutional rights, and thus it granted 
qualified immunity without proceeding to the second step.  Because we find that the 
defendants involved in the second incident are not entitled to summary judgment on 
Smith’s excessive force claim, we must vacate this conclusion in part.  On remand, the 
District Court should determine in the first instance whether the defendants are 
nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity under the second step.  Cf. Estate of Smith v. 
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 511 (3d Cir. 2003).  Although, as noted, the video evidence is not 
entirely clear, the District Court should, to the extent possible, analyze the specific 
conduct of each defendant in its qualified immunity analysis, rather than the defendants 
as a whole.  See id.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s qualified immunity 
ruling, but only as to Smith’s claim of excessive force in the second incident. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the 
case to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
